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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal as of right from a final judgment in a civil 
case in the district court. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah 
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992). As 
authorized by § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court transferred the case 
to the Court of Appeals on or about March 30, 1993. The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Were there disputed factual issues which precluded 
summary judgment, where the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert 
affirmatively showed that he had expertise helpful to the court 
concerning defendant's failure to give proper care to the decedent? 
The propriety of summary judgment and the admissibility of the 
expert's affidavit both present legal issues which are reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference to the trial court. Butterfield v. 
Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992). 
2. Does a technical non-compliance with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 4-501 justify the trial court in disregarding 
obvious factual disputes, where the record plainly shows that the 
facts are disputed? This Court should review to determine if the 
trial court abused its discretion. See Berrett v. Denver and Rio 
Grande Western RR Co. , 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
3. Did the trial court err in purporting to bolster the 
record after having granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment? This presents a question of law to be reviewed de novo 
by the court. See Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc. . 815 P.2d 1356, 
1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
A copy of Rule 4-501 of the. Utah Code of Judicial Administra-
tion is reproduced in the addendum. Appellants are not aware of 
any other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
or regulations, whose interpretation is determinative of the issues 
on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A . N a t u r e o l t h e L a o c » IIIIIIL. I » i nil iiiin d i t:a I m n 1 jjf . i t ' l ±r,e 
action. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. James and 
H e l e i "i 111
 ( iiiii 'i i iiii|i il ill 11 v 1111(111,11 in my iiiiii i i m i n | MI r e n t s i i i i ini h e i r s < 
their deceased son, Ted Dikeou, filed their Complaint and Jury 
Demand on July Named * defendants were Dr. 
* i an., who a 1 legedly 
failed to properly tre.i^ ^ Dikeou, causing his death; 
Hospita *vr*~.i - - taken for treatmei 
T =id Dikeou ..... J, * >*logist, who 
allegedly misprescribed medication for Ted Dikeo hereby causing 
his death. (Id.) 
E c ] 1 ::) i i :i in: ig c , sched'uling conference held February 11 , 1992 , the 
court gave plaintiffs approximate- month, until March 16, 
1992 , designate the ^r-» il mi I 11 i < v , \ u » i i i 11 »bses. 
before the time that plaintiffs were 
designated their* experts, defendant Osborn mov ed for 
summary j udgment i m I II i > i ) i i m 1 1 1 III II II I  1 1 II a n 1 1 I I i ( I : t ; 1 m, 11 II i Il  >, i . t 
designated an expert 'witness able to establish breach o( the dut', 
of care and causation. (R. 132-34, 135-203,) Plaintiffs timely 
served their designator i nesFe1- \\ \ \\ i
 |( IM | I. n) 
and r^sponac motion for summary judgment ten days 
later, March - . \v^2 ,R, 225-251.) Plaintiffs'' response was 
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based primarily on the affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., an 
emergency room physician. (R. 232-237.) 
Osborn moved to strike the affidavit of Dr. Bushnell. (R. 
252-53.) Plaintiffs timely filed their response to the motion to 
strike on April 16, 1992. (R. 273-86.) In a signed minute entry 
filed the next day, the court granted both defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and the motion to strike the affidavit of Dr. 
Bushnell. (R. 287-90.) In the minute entry, the court stated it 
had reviewed certain memoranda but gave no indication it had 
reviewed plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
strike, filed the day before the ruling. (Id.) The formal Summary 
Judgment and Order was entered May 8, 1992. (R. 340-43.) 
Following the court's signed minute entry granting summary 
judgment, defendant sought to bolster the record by including 
additional materials which defendant claimed supported the summary 
judgment. (R. 297-98.) The motion was filed May 8, 1992, and the 
court entered an order granting the motion on the same day (R. 3 38-
39) , several days prior to the time plaintiffs' response to the 
motion would have been due.1 
The case against the remaining two defendants was settled on 
or about July 21, 1992. (R. 356.) An order dismissing the case 
*The certificate of service attached to the motion indicates 
that it was hand delivered to plaintiffs' counsel on Friday, May 1, 
1992. Plaintiffs' response would have been due no sooner than 
Monday, May 11, 1992. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 
4-501(1)(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e). Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1)(d), 
the court should not have decided the matter until after submission 
of a notice to submit for decision. 
4 
was entered September . (R. 358-60. Plaintiffs timely 
Appea Jtober 
Statement of Facts. ippropriat* summary 
judgment proceeding, the following facts are stated 
most favorable tc plaintiffs, ai id reasonable inferences are drawn 
in plaintiffs' favor where appropriate,, Wineaar v, Froerer Corp. , 
813 P 2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
Ted Dikeou had a moderately common condition identified as the 
Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome (WPW) which relates an abnormal 
electrical conduct inn •» •,,it IIIII in I III > IHMIIII f | III II 
proper medical treatment, likely have achieved a normal 
life expectancy Osborr cardiologist (R. 
evening February Jikeou called Osborn and 
reported that his heart was beatinq fast. Ted said that he had 
cause increased heart bea , . Osborn advised 
Ted to i^ ,—w symptoms would abate 
) 
Ted's heart beat clii d i lot slow down, a~r* h- -ailed ~- Osborn 
again early in *  c morning of February 21, 9C< ) Dr. 
a 11 < i' I 
- -.. -. . Osborn discussed where *-• could obtain the 
injection. Ted inquired whether ^ould be ^ :
 3w LO the 
because , ^P to hi s 
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home. Dr. Osborn informed Ted that Dr. Osborn did not have staff 
privileges at St. Mark's Hospital, but stated that it would be fine 
if Ted went there for treatment. (R. 157, 183, 248.) 
Ted Dikeou walked into the emergency room at St. Mark's 
Hospital. (R. 173.) He was able to converse with the emergency 
room physician in a normal manner. (R. 187.) When Ted's mother, 
Helen Dikeou, suggested that the emergency room physician call Dr. 
Osborn, Ted gave him the telephone number for Dr. Osborn. (R. 
167.) 
Dr. Dowdall, the emergency room physician, called Dr. Osborn 
and discussed Ted's condition with him. Dr. Dowdall reported that 
Ted was in paroxysmal atrial tachycardia (PAT). (R. 158.) Dr. 
Osborn made no effort to verify the diagnosis but suggested that 
the appropriate treatment was IV Verapamil. (Id.) 
In fact, Ted was not suffering from PAT, but was in atrial 
fibrillation. (R. 159.) This was revealed by the monitor strip 
from the EKG (R. 199) , and Dr. Osborn presumably could have 
determined that had he gone to the hospital to verify Dr. Dowdall's 
diagnosis. Verapamil is not an appropriate medication for someone 
experiencing atrial fibrillation. (R. 160.) 
As a result of the improper medication given to Ted, he went 
into cardiac arrest. The hospital staff performed CPR and 
electrical defibrillation. (R. 190.) The efforts at overcoming 
the effect of the medication were unsuccessful, and Ted left the 
6 
emergency room ^~ ~ (R. 168.) He passed away March 2, 1990. 
(See I 
Dowdall , the emergency room physician, would liked to have 
had Ted Dikeou lother hospital so that created 
claimed that .* could not treat him at the St. Mar* emergency 
room, bec^ iie=' lacked privileges there. (R. f ? leo ^ Although 
Mark's, h * - icivise him against going there. (R. i 
Had Dr. Osborn requested, he undoubtedly would have been granted 
emergency 
situation. (R. 235, .Isbor' - • -.d later go to St 
Mark' no Ted's death examined Ted, reviewed his medical 
re s condition with Mr. and 
Mrs. Dikeou. (R. c 
Osborn's refusal u adequate treatment and 
diagnosis IUJI his patient resulted i - ath ot Ted Dikeou. 
23 6.) Osborn knew or should have known that the medication 
provided to Dikeou Dowdal 
condition, ) The excuse given by 
treating his patient, that he did not ha\* >staf \ rr> vilege^ 
Mark's, w>. 
Dr. Osborn could have received courtesy staff privilege 
could have otherwise provided for adequate treatment „ 
) 
7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case was decided on a motion for summary judgment. All 
reasonable inferences from the depositions and affidavits should 
have been drawn in favor of the plaintiffs, and any doubt as to the 
propriety of summary judgment should have been resolved in favor of 
plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have the burden to present expert testimony showing 
that Dr. Osborn's treatment of Ted Dikeou fell below the applicable 
standard of care. Although Dr. Osborn was a cardiologist, the 
primary issue in this case was not unique to the specialty of 
cardiology, but rather involved the relationship between a 
patient's primary physician and the emergency room personnel. 
Plaintiffs fulfilled their burden by presenting the affidavit of J. 
Fred Bushnell, M.D., an emergency room physician with extensive 
practice in Utah and other states. Dr. Bushnell7s affidavit 
affirmatively showed that he was familiar with the standard of care 
applicable to Dr. Osborn. The trial court erred in failing to read 
the affidavit in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and in 
striking the affidavit and granting summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs' failure to strictly comply with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 4-501 did not justify entry of summary 
judgment against plaintiffs. The record clearly showed disputed 
issues of fact. The trial court erred in mechanically enforcing 
the provisions of the rule. 
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Summary judgment must be based ~he documents on f * ** at the 
time in 11 ' >- * ' " tl in 
i1: issued a signed minute entry granting ammary judgment. 
Defendant's attempt olster the record after the fact was 
improper, a r def endant s 
motion to to the record, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF J. FRED BUSHNELL CREATED A FACTUAL ISSUE 
CONCERNING DR. OSBORN'S NEGLIGENCE. 
response Osborn's motion ummary judgment, 
plaintiffs had the burden. nedica o 
establisr standard care applicabl Osborn breach 
-.hat standard, and resulting damages. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) iaintiffs ' hat burden by offering 
Affidavi ^ushnell, M.D. - > 4- copy i i i 
adde* Ji i shi ie] ] , 
whose
 H i ^ . / . . specialty wat> emergency , ^oc\ medicine, was not 
competent ostifv concerning the standard c^ _ai^ applicable to 
• 
Plaintiffs are aware of the standards relating ^- expert 
witness affidavits. Notwithstanding language that affida\ ts are 
I i""! ] 
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opposing summary judgment, e.g., Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, 
Inc. . 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979), and that all doubts be 
resolved in favor of proceeding to trial, King v. Searle Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc. . 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
has imposed stiffer requirements on expert witness affidavits than 
would be required if the expert were present in person. Butter-
field v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992). An expert witness at 
trial can testify without detailing the underlying facts or data, 
unless in the fluid give-and-take of trial the judge or opposing 
party require greater foundation. In a summary judgment affidavit, 
however, the expert is required to anticipate possible foundation 
objections and affirmatively show the facts reviewed and the basis 
for the expert opinion. Id. 
The affidavit of Dr. Bushnell satisfies this stringent test. 
Dr. Bushnell had practiced in Utah and had extensive experience in 
other states and foreign countries. (R. 240-43.) He detailed the 
records he had reviewed to become familiar with the facts (R. 23 3 
55 8-9), and restated the important facts in giving his opinion. 
(R. 233-36 55 11-23.) 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. 
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Consistent with this rule, a medical practitioner in one field 
has knowledge which "will assist the trier of fact" concerning the 
practice in another medical specialty, if the expert affirmatively 
shows that he or she is familiar with the standard of care 
applicable to the other specialty. Burton v. Youncrblood, 711 P.2d 
245, 248 (Utah 1985). 
A related aspect of this rule is that a specialist in one 
field may testify concerning the negligence of a specialist in 
another field if the negligence relates to an issue not within the 
specialty. Slayton v. Brunner, 633 S.W.2d 29 (Ark. 1982), 
illustrates this exception. Slayton suffered a cardiac arrest and 
died following surgery performed by Brunner. Brunner moved for 
summary judgment and submitted expert testimony to show he was not 
negligent. The plaintiff opposed the motion with the affidavit of 
an anesthesiologist. The defendant argued and the trial court held 
that an anesthesiologist could not testify concerning the standard 
of care applicable to a surgeon. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
disagreed: 
Appellee Brunner argues that Dr. King, an 
anesthesiologist, is not qualified to testify 
as an expert in the specialty of surgery. 
However, both are medical school graduates 
licensed to practice in their respective 
states. Appellant does not allege that appel-
lee was negligent in performing the actual 
surgical procedure used to repair the ventral 
hernia and remove the marlex mesh. Negligence 
is alleged in procedures performed or omitted 
before and after the actual surgery. 
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633 S.W.2d at 30. The court reversed the summary judgment and 
remanded for trial. Accord Harlev v. Catholic Medical Center of 
Brooklyn and Queens, Inc., 88 Misc. 2d 126, 386 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 
(Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 57 A.D.2d 827, 394 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div. 
1977) (doctor of another specialty qualified to testify if "the 
inquiry falls within his expertise, as distinguished from his 
specialty.") (emphasis by the court). 
The issue in the instant case concerned the relationship 
between the patient's regular physician and an emergency room 
physician, an area well within Dr. Bushnell's expertise. The 
claimed negligence in this case did not deal with an issue unique 
to Dr. Osborn's specialty. Dr. Osborn, a cardiologist, was the 
decedent's primary physician. The decedent entered St. Mark's 
Hospital for treatment of a heart problem. Dr. Osborn consulted 
with the St. Mark's emergency room physician by telephone, but 
declined to provide necessary personal diagnosis because he did not 
have staff privileges at St. Mark's. The emergency room physician 
told Dr. Osborn by telephone that the decedent was experiencing 
paroxysmal atrial tachycardia (PAT). Based on this information, 
Dr. Osborn concurred with the emergency room physician's proposed 
treatment. 
In fact, the decedent was experiencing atrial fibrillation, 
not PAT, and the proposed treatment only exacerbated the problem. 
Dr. Osborn testified that had he received correct information, he 
would have given different advice. (R. 160.) A reasonable 
12 
inference is that had Dr. Osborn personally examined his patient 
rather than relying on the diagnosis of a non-cardiologist, he 
would have discovered the decedent7s actual condition and would 
have given correct advice. 
The issue, therefore, is whether Dr. Osborn could and should 
have personally examined the decedent. Dr. Osborn testified the 
reason he didn't was because he lacked staff privileges. (R. 160.) 
This excuse was contradicted by Dr. Bushnell's affidavit: 
2. I am a medical doctor, have been a 
physician for 36 years (since 1955) and am 
currently a physician specialist and con-
sultant in emergency medicine. 
7. I am specialty qualified in Emer-
gency Medicine. I am also board eligible in 
Quality Assurance and Utilization Review. 
(Please refer to submitted curriculum vitae.) 
8. I have reviewed the medical records 
on Theodore James "Ted" Dikeou from the pri-
vate practice of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and 
from St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room for 
the treatment rendered to Ted Dikeou on the 
night of February 20-21, 1990. 
9. I have also read transcripts of the 
depositions of Mrs. Helen Dikeou, Dr. Jeffrey 
S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall. 
10. Having read and studied the docu-
ments listed above, I have formed a profes-
sional opinion as to the standard of medical 
care applicable in this case and whether 
Doctors Osborn and Dowdall adhered to that 
standard of care in their treatment of Ted 
Dikeou. 
11. Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., was Ted 
Dikeou's personal physician, and as such, was 
the physician best informed as to Ted Dikeou's 
13 
heart condition, his general health and medi-
cal history. 
12. Twice during the evening of February 
20-21, 1990, before his arrival at St. Mark's 
Hospital, Ted Dikeou had phoned Dr. Osborn 
regarding his rapid heart rate. By Dr. 
Osborn's own deposition testimony, this is the 
first time Ted's Wolff-Parkinson-White 
Syndrome had manifested itself over a pro-
longed period, as all prior incidents had been 
of short duration and resolved spontaneously 
with rest. 
13. Dr. Osborn was aware of the unique 
nature of this occurrence, and by his own 
testimony noted that this prolonged episode 
warranted further testing, investigation and 
treatment of Ted Dikeoufs prolonged tachy-
cardia — a presentation made gravely ominous 
by Ted's known diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-
White syndrome. This is the standard of 
medical care which applies to Dr. Jeffrey 
Osborn. 
14. Dr. Osborn was aware of Ted Dikeou's 
asthma and was informed by Ted Dikeou that he 
had taken asthma medication earlier that 
evening. Dr. Osborn was also aware of the 
specific medications which Ted Dikeou took and 
was aware that these medications can trigger a 
rapid heart beat as well as cause irregulari-
ties in the cardiac rhythm, which would be 
especially significant for someone with Wolff-
Parkinson-White Syndrome. 
15. Despite his professional relation-
ship with Ted Dikeou and his awareness that further action on his part was required, Dr. 
Osborn failed to appreciate the seriousness of 
this occurrence, failed to investigate the 
change in his patient's symptoms, failed to 
recommend that Ted Dikeou meet him at the 
hospital where Dr. Osborn has staff privileges 
and in general, failed to respond in any 
manner to his patient's condition. 
16. Once Ted Dikeou arrived at St. 
Mark's Hospital, Dr. Michael D. Dowdall began 
treatment which was based on improper evalua-
14 
tion of Ted Dikeou's heart monitor pattern, 
which treatment, rather than relieving Ted's 
symptoms, exacerbated them. 
17. Dr. Dowdall phoned Dr. Osborn for 
his expertise and advice in dealing with Ted 
Dikeou's heart condition. In his deposition, 
Dr. Dowdall testified that he had confidence 
in Dr. Osborn's advice. 
18. At the time of Dr. Dowdall's phone 
call, Dr. Osborn was put on further notice 
that his patient, Ted Dikeou, was continuing 
to have a rapid heart beat, even after Ted had 
received one dose of verapamil intravenously. 
This indicated an even longer period of un-
resolved medically serious rapid ventricular 
heart rate associated with his Wolff-
Parkinson-White Syndrome. Again Dr. Osborn 
failed to respond by going to the emergency 
room to confirm or modify Dr. Dowdallfs moni-
tor diagnosis. Dr. Osborne [sic] should have 
known now, if not before, that aspects of this 
medical problem were inconsistent and required 
a reevaluation by Dr. Osborne [sic] in person. 
Dr. Osborne [sic] could have requested that 
Ted be transferred to a hospital of Dr. 
Osbornfs choice or that Dr. Dowdall seek 
guidance from the cardiologist on call at St. 
Mark's Hospital immediately and before order-
ing or agreeing to additional therapy. 
19. Dr. Osborn suggested the administra-
tion of medication to Ted Dikeou that night 
without confirming the condition for which he 
was prescribing, thereby playing a major role 
in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his 
subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death. 
20. As a physician specialist in emer-
gency medicine, I am aware of the relationship 
between emergency physicians and other doctors 
who do and do not have hospital privileges at 
a particular facility. 
21. Dr. Osborn has stated he did not 
come to St. Mark's Hospital because he did not 
have staff privileges there. In my experi-
ence, Dr. Osborn would undoubtedly have been 
granted courtesy hospital privileges if he had 
15 
presented himself at St. Mark's Hospital to 
assist or consult in the treatment of his 
patient, Ted Dikeou. In fact, a few days 
later, by Dr. Osborn's deposition testimony, 
he did appear at St. Mark,s Hospital and was 
permitted to check on Ted Dikeou and review 
his medical records. Another method is fre-
quently used in the emergency department to 
surmount the problem of participation by a 
physician who does not have pre-approval of 
hospital privileges. It is for the emergency 
physician to consult with any physician who 
comes to the hospital and together they can 
decide about a patient. The resulting deci-
sions and therapy are then implemented by the 
emergency physicians orders. 
• • • • 
23. In my professional opinion, both Dr. 
Jeffrey S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall 
were negligent in their treatment of Ted 
Dikeou and failed to meet the applicable 
standards of medical care. 
(R. 232-36) (italics added). 
In summary, the issue in this case was whether Dr. Osborn 
could and should have made a personal examination and diagnosis of 
the decedent's condition, rather than relying solely on the 
diagnosis of the emergency room physician. The issue concerns the 
relationship between a primary care physician and the emergency 
room physician. The issue also concerns whether Dr. Osborn could 
have provided a personal examination where he did not have staff 
privileges. The issue of Dr. Osborn's practice in the area of his 
specialty is of only secondary concern, because Dr. Osborn himself 
admitted that further testing was necessary and had he received 
correct information he would have given different advice. All 
these matters were within the professional expertise of Dr. 
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Bushnell.2 The trial court erred in striking Dr. Bushnell's 
affidavit and in granting summary judgment to Dr. Osborn. 
POINT II 
THE TECHNICAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4-501 
DID NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS7 CASE. 
Defendant argued below and the trial court held that plain-
tiffs had admitted away their case by failing to respond to 
defendant's factual assertions using the precise format specified 
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The 
relevant portions of the rule state: 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mo-
tion. The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise state-
ment of material facts as to which the party 
2Even if this Court were to conclude that there was some 
technical defect in Dr. Bushnell's description of his familiarity 
with the applicable standard of care, this Court should hold that 
a reasonable inference from the description given is that Dr. 
Bushnell did have the requisite familiarity. At trial, if a party 
object to testimony for lack of foundation, the witness can give 
further testimony to cure the defect. The same flexibility is not 
available with an affidavit. It is extremely difficult to 
anticipate every conceivable objection to an affidavit. This Court 
should rule that reasonable inferences should be drawn from 
foundational testimony the same as from substantive testimony. 
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contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to 
those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, 
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences 
of the movants facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the movant7s 
statement and properly supported by an accu-
rate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the oppos-
ing party's statement. 
This rule must be read in light of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), 
which permits granting summary judgment only "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." In this case, the depositions, 
interrogatory answers, and affidavits did reveal issues of fact, 
including whether Dr. Osborn could have treated Ted Dikeou at St. 
Mark/s, whether Dr. Osborn made a reasonable effort to determine if 
Dr. Dowdall's diagnosis of PAT was accurate, whether Dr. Osborn 
should have been altered to the inaccuracy of the diagnosis because 
the medication given was not having the desired effect, and the 
ultimate issue of whether Dr. Osborn was negligent. Plaintiffs' 
entire memorandum opposing summary judgment was devoted to showing 
that Dr. Osborn's factual assertions were controverted. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) requires that the rules be construed to 
promote justice, a concept the Utah Supreme Court has long 
recognized. Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products. 
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Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973) ("The pleadings 
are never more important than the cause that is before the court . 
. ..") It is apparent from the trial court's ruling that it in 
fact decided the case on the merits, and that the comments 
concerning the failure to satisfy Rule 4-501 were make-weight. It 
would have been an abuse of discretion to have decided the case 
solely on the procedural failure where the facts were obviously 
disputed. If the trial court's ruling is based on the technical 
defect, the judgment must be reversed. 
POINT III 
BOLSTERING THE RECORD AFTER THE DECISION ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER. 
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment by minute entry dated April 22, 1992. On April 29, 1992, 
defendant made a motion to bolster the record by adding plaintiffs' 
answers to two different sets of interrogatories. The court 
granted the motion by order entered May 8, 1992. The order was 
procedurally and substantively improper. 
The order was procedurally improper because the court ruled 
before plaintiffs had an opportunity to respond. The motion was 
served by hand delivery on May 1, 1992. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs had ten days, 
until May 11, to respond. The trial court had already granted the 
motion before plaintiffs' response was due. Also violated was Rule 
4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which prohibits 
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proposed orders from being submitted to the judge prior to 
submission to opposing counsel. 
The order was substantively improper because Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c) requires that a ruling on summary judgment be based on the 
documents on file at the time of the ruling. This is inappropriate 
because on review of the trial court7s decision, the appellate 
court should consider only the record that was before the trial 
court at the time of its decision. Olson v. Park-Craicr-Olson, 
Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also Reserve 
Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982); Moore v. 
Pacific Northwest Bell, 662 P.2d 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) ("A 
court reviewing a dismissal on summary judgment is confined to 
examining the record properly before the trial court.") In 
addition, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that lf [g]enerally, 
issues raised for the first time in post-judgment motions are 
raised too late to be reviewed on appeal." Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court's decision should be judged solely by the 
documents which were before the court at the time of decision. 
Allowing either side to supplement the record after decision would 
be bad policy. The order enlarging the record should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Although defendant Dr. Osborn was a cardiologist, his 
negligence revolved around his interaction with the emergency room 
physician, rather than the practice of his specialty per se. 
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Plaintiffs7 expert, Dr. Bushnell, was an eminent emergency room 
physician and fully competent to testify concerning Dr. Osborn,s 
negligence. The summary judgment should be reversed, the order 
enlarging the record vacated, and the matter remanded for trial. 
DATED this _J_ day of May, 1993. 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
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P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
t:dikeou.brf 
2 1 
JACKSON HOWARD (1548) and 
FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 Our File No. 19,899 
Provo, Utah 84603 q:bushnell.aff 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K. : 
DIKEOU, individually and as the 
natural parents and heirs of the : AFFIDAVIT OF 
estate of THEODORE "TED" JAMES J. FRED BUSHNELL, MX). 
DIKEOU, deceased, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., : 
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, M.D., and 
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH, : Civil No. 919004651CV 
INC., d/b/aST, MARK'S Judge: Richard H. Moffat 
HOSPITAL, : 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF ORANGE ) 
J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I live in Laguna Niguel, California. 
2. I am a medical doctor, have been a physician for 36 years (since 1955) and am 
currently a physician specialist and consultant in emergency medicine. 
3. In 1951, I graduated from Brigham Young University with a Bachelor of Arts 
degree in mathematics. 
4. Following my undergraduate college studies I attended Stanford University 
medical school, where I graduated in 1955. 
5. I completed a surgical internship at George Washington University Hospital, 
Washington, D.C. in 1956. 
6. My medical post graduate training includes academic residencies and fellowships 
at George Washington University Hospital (General Surgery) and University of California, Los 
Angeles (Surgical Oncology followed by Diagnostic Radiology). 
7. I am specialty qualified in Emergency Medicine. I am also board eligible in 
Quality Assurance and Utilization Review. (Please refer to submitted curriculum vitae.) 
8. I have reviewed the medical records on Theodore James "Ted" Dikeou from the 
private practice of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and from St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room 
for the treatment rendered to Ted Dikeou on the night of February 20-21, 1990. 
9. I have also read transcripts of the depositions of Mrs. Helen Dikeou, Dr. Jeffrey 
S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. Dowdall. 
10. Having read and studied the documents listed above, I have formed a 
professional opinion as to the standard of medical care applicable in this case and whether 
Doctors Osborn and Dowdall adhered to that standard of care in their treatment of Ted 
Dikeou. 
11. Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., was Ted Dikeou's personal physician, and as such, was 
the physician best informed as to Ted Dikeou's heart condition, his general health and 
medical history. 
2 
12. Twice during the evening of February 20-21, 1990, before his arrival at St. 
Mark's Hospital, Ted Dikeou had phoned Dr. Osbom regarding his rapid heart rate. By Dr. 
Osborn's own deposition testimony, this is the first time Ted's Wolff-Parkinson-White 
Syndrome had manifested itself over a prolonged period, as all prior incidents had been of 
short duration and resolved spontaneously with rest. 
13. Dr. Osbom was aware of the unique nature of this occurrence, and by his own 
testimony noted that this prolonged episode warranted further testing, investigation and 
treatment of Ted Dikeou's prolonged tachycardia - a presentation made gravely ominous by 
Ted's known diagnosis of Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome. This is the standard of medical 
care which applies to Dr. Jeffrey Osbom. 
14. Dr. Osbom was aware of Ted Dikeou's asthma and was informed by Ted 
Dikeou that he had taken asthma medication earlier that evening. Dr. Osbom was also 
aware of the specific medications which Ted Dikeou took and was aware that these 
medications can trigger a rapid heart beat as well as cause irregularities in the cardiac rhythm, 
which would be especially significant for someone with Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome. 
15. Despite his professional relationship with Ted Dikeou and his awareness that 
further action on his part was required, Dr. Osbom failed to appreciate the seriousness of 
this occurrence, failed to investigate the change in his patient's symptoms, failed to 
recommend that Ted Dikeou meet him at the hospital where Dr. Osbom has staff privileges 
and in general, failed to respond in any manner to his patient's condition. 
16. Once Ted Dikeou arrived at St. Mark's Hospital, Dr. Michael D. Dowdall began 
treatment which was based on improper evaluation of Ted Dikeou's heart monitor pattern, 
which treatment, rather than relieving Ted's symptoms, exacerbated them. 
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17. Dr. Dowdall phoned Dr. Osborn for his expertise and advice in dealing with Ted 
Dikeou's heart condition. In his deposition, Dr. Dowdall testified that he had confidence in 
Dr. Osborn's advice. 
18. At the time of Dr. Dowdall's phone call, Dr. Osborn was put on further notice 
that his patient, Ted Dikeou, was continuing to have a rapid heart beat, even after Ted had 
received one dose of verapamil intravenously. This indicated an even longer period of 
unresolved medically serious rapid ventricular heart rate associated with his Wolff-Parkinson-
White Syndrome. Again Dr. Osborn failed to respond by going to the emergency room to 
confirm or modify Dr. Dowdall's monitor diagnosis. Dr. Osborne should have known now, 
if not before, that aspects of this medical problem were inconsistent and required a 
reevaluation by Dr. Osborne in person. Dr. Osborne could have requested that Ted be 
transferred to a hospital of Dr. Osborn's choice or that Dr. Dowdall seek guidance from the 
cardiologist on call at St. Mark's Hospital immediately and before ordering or agreeing to 
additional therapy. 
19. Dr. Osborn suggested the administration of medication to Ted Dikeou that night 
without confirming the condition for which he was prescribing, thereby playing a major role 
in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death. 
20. As a physician specialist in emergency medicine, I am aware of the relationship 
between emergency physicians and other doctors who do and do not have hospital privileges 
at a particular facility. 
21. Dr. Osborn has stated he did not come to St. Mark's Hospital because he did 
not have staff privileges there. In my experience, Dr. Osborn would undoubtedly have been 
granted courtesy hospital privileges if he had presented himself at St. Mark's Hospital to assist 
or consult in the treatment of his patient, Ted Dikeou. In fact, a few days later, by Dr. 
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Osborn's deposition testimony, he did appear at St. Mark's Hospital and was permitted to 
check on Ted Dikeou and review his medical records. Another method is frequently used in 
the emergency department to surmount the problem of participation by a physician who does 
not have pre-approval of hospital privileges. It is for the emergency physician to consult with 
any physician who comes to the hospital and together they can decide about a patient. The 
resulting decisions and therapy are then implemented by the emergency physician's orders. 
22. Dr. Dowdall also failed to meet the applicable standard of medical care in his 
diagnosis and treatment of Ted Dikeou. Dr. Dowdall made a mistake and failed to read 
Ted's cardiac pattern correctly, misinformed Dr. Osborn of the nature of the monitor pattern 
and administered to Ted Dikeou inappropriate medications which not only failed to relieve 
his problem, but which caused further sensitization of Ted Dikeou's heart, leading to his 
cardiac arrest, coma and death. 
23. In my professional opinion, both Dr. Jeffrey S. Osborn and Dr. Michael D. 
Dowdall were negligent in their treatment of Ted Dikeou and failed to meet the applicable 
standards of medical care. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 1992. 
JVFRED BUSHNELL, M.D. 




Sworn and verified to me by telephone communication this %to day of March, 1992, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 69-1-2, and I therefore attach my seal as Notary Public. 
DTARY PUBLIC 
V 'J L- «, O { 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
J. FRED BUSHNELL. M. D. 
13 Parkman Road 
Laguna Niguel, California 92677-4115 
Telephones 
Date of Birth 
Place of Birth 
(714) 496-5112 Fax 248-7120 
August 4,1928 













GRADUATE Provo High School, Provo, Utah. 
B.A. DEGREE Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Major Mathematics, Minor English. 
M.D. DEGREE Stanford University School of Medicine, Stanford, 
California 94305. 
INTERNSHIP IN SURGERY George Washington University Hospital, 
Washington, D.C. 
RESIDENT IN GENERAL SURGERY George Washington University 
Hospital, Washington, D.C. 
SURGICAL GRADUATE RESEARCH FELLOW Cancer 
Chemotherapy, UCLA Medical Center, Los Angeles, California. 
RESIDENT IN DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY, UCU Medical Center, Los 
Angeles, California. 
Dean's List Honors Brigham Young University. 
Newell Scholar four years at Stanford. 
Newhouse Scholar three years at Stanford. 
ARABIC - spoken in social and medical situations. 
ENGLISH - native language with advanced study. 
GERMAN - two years university level study. 
ITALIAN - basics for social dialogue. 
MEDICAL LATIN and MEDICAL GREEK - basic study. 
SPANISH - fluent with correct grammar, both verbal and written. 
STAT Seminars To Assist Teachers for graduate physicians entering 
teaching. Created by the Graduate Research Division in Education, 
use. 
ACTIVITIES 
1962-1963 SURGICAL GRADUATE RESEARCH FELLOW Cancer 
Chemotherapy, UCLA. The cancer research project was part of a 
nationwide protocol designed to determine whether the combination 
of radiation therapy and radiomimetic chemotherapy drugs given 
concurrently would have a synergistic effect. Funded by U.S. Public 
Health Service Grant Number CYF - 6105. 
With two other surgery specialists we operated the Advanced Breast 
Tumor Clinic and the Surgical Cancer Chemotherapy Clinic. We were 
consultants in cancer for the UCLA Medical Center. 
1973 -1974 USC RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
QUALITY OF EMERGENCY CARE ASSESSMENT I was a principle 
member of the organization team to develop a protocol and obtain 
grant money for a study named: A Project to Evaluate the Affect on 
Quality of Emergency Medical Care by the creation and use of a super 
paramedic or EMT III as part of a soecial emergency medical team. 
HEW Contract Number 110-71-119. 
APOMORPHINE-NALOXONE STUDY Researched, developed and 
obtained approval to test a protocol for an apomorphine naloxone 
study in the Department of Emergency Medicine. This was effeaive in 
treating overdose patients. 
HYPERTENSION SCREENING PROJECT I was responsible for the 
work assignments of fifty Physician Assistant trainees. Organized a 
program for them to find and treat the asymptomatic hypertensive 
patients among the more than one thousand patients seen daily in the 
Emergency Department. This project was chosen as a scientific 
exhibit for the AMA convention in Chicago, June 1974. 
HOSPITAL EMERGENCY SERVICES AUDIT I was the physician 
from Los Angeles County for this project: An Audit of Hospital 
Emergency Departments .conducted by California Hospital Association 
through Hospital Councifof Southern California. Funded by a grant 
from Regional Medical Programs Contract RMP -73-15 (E) - 146M. 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
Salt Lake County Medical Society. 
Los Angeles County Medical Society. 
Foundation for Emergency Medical Education, Inc. Director. 
CHARTER MEMBER American College Emergency Physicians. 
Board Of Directors of California Chapter. 
CHAIRMAN Research and Publication Committee. 
Socio-Economic Committee 
Hospital and Contracts Committee 
Ethics Committee 
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NATIONAL COUNSELOR representing the California Chapter of the 
American College of Emergency Physicians. 
NATIONAL CONSULTANT IN EMERGENCY MEDICINE designated 
by the California Chapter of the American College of Emergency 
Physicians. 
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND 
1959-1961 HEBER CITY, UTAH. Private practice partnership. Associated with a 
General Surgeon and a General Practitioner 
1964-1973 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. 
Private practice solo. Emphasis on surgical management of major 
trauma victims, oncology patients and cancer chemotherapy. Practice 
later limited to the acute surgical management of major trauma 
patients. 
Participated as part time staff for emergency services at Holy Cross 
Hospital, San Fernando, California; Riverside Hospital, North 
Hollywood, California, St.Frances Hospital, Lynnwood, California; 
Paramount General Hospital, Paramount, California; St. Joseph 
Hospital, Burbank, California. 
TUMOR BOARD 
Holy Cross Hospital, San Fernando, California. 
St. Joseph Hospital, Burbank, California. 
1973 -1974 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. PHYSICIAN SPECIALIST 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE. Department of Emergency Medicine, Los 
Angeles County University of Southern California Medical Center. 
CLINICAL INSTRUCTOR OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE LAC - USC 
Medical Center. Responsible for clinical and didactic teaching of 
medical students, nurses, interns, residents, and paramedics. 
CLINICAL COORDINATOR primarily responsible for the work 
assignments and both clinical and didactic instruction of Physician 
Assistant trainees in the Department of Emergency Medicine. 
EXECUTIVE STAFF IN THE ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT OF 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE. Los Angeles County University of 
Southern California Medical Center. 
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HEAD PHYSICIAN. Main Emergency Department, Los Angeles 
County USC Medical Center. 
The Head Physician work position is unique. It requires conspicuous 
clinical performance plus total administrative responsibility for the 
thirty physicians providing care within the Emergency Department. 
The position includes other duties besides teaching and the efficient 
function of the emergency service. On the evening and night shifts 
THE HEAD PHYSICIAN has authority as acting medical director for ail 
of the two thousand bed four hospital medical complex. 
It requires a physician capable of making prompt decisions and 
prepared to make rapid diagnosis. The physician uses triage by 
priority of need, and treats or dispositions the patients. The position is 
designed to teach by example the inherent differences in medical 
thinking needed by an emergency physician. 
COMMITTEES LAC - USC MEDICAL CENTER 
EXECUTIVE STAFF Committee Emergency Department 
Research Committee. 
Peer Review Committee. 
Education Committee - Library Committee. 
Disaster Planning Committee, Senior Medical Operations Officer. 
Quality Assessment Committee 
Medical Care Evaluation Committee 
Chart Review Committee. 
Death Review Committee. 
EMERGENCY MEDICINE REVIEW COMMITTEE for Los Angeles 
County Task Force to inspect and evaluate seventy-five hospitals 
applying for a County Emergency Aid Plan contract. 
1975 PARAMOUNT, CALIFORNIA. DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT and Paramedic Base Station Radio Operation. 
CHAIRMAN Emergency Services Committee. 
CHAIRMAN Regional Joint Paramedic Committee for Southeast Los 
Angeles County. 
1976 NORWALK, CALIFORNIA. Director Emergency Department 
Norwalk Community Hospital. 
1976 - 1977 RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA. RIVERSIDE COUNTY GENERAL 
HOSPITAL. Recruited to upgrade the emergency services to 
Departmental Status and to begin full time staffing by a group of 
Physician Specialists in Emergency Medicine. Teaching programs 
were organized for the house staff who rotated there from Loma Linda 
University Medical Center. 
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1977-1978 PASADENA, CALIFORNIA. Huntington Memorial Hospital. Six 
months full time consultation to evaluate feasibility of starting a 
residency program in Emergency Medicine. 
1977 LIHUE, KAUAI, HAWAII. G.N. WILCOX HOSPITAL EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT. Site evaluation to organize and improve the quality of 
their emergency services. Invited to join the Emergency Department 
staff of Kauai Medical Group at G.N. Wilcox Hospital in November 
1977. (Previous locum tenens in June 1976 and June 1977.) 
1977 NATIONAL BOARD EXAMINATION written as required by the State of 
Hawaii to obtain a permanent Hawaiian License. State of Hawaii 
Medical License Number 03325. 
1978 -1980 MISSION VIEJO, CALIFORNIA. MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL 
Full time staff Emergency Department. 
MISSION COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ACTIVITIES 
Certified as INSTRUCTOR in Advanced Cardiac Life Support 
(ACLS). In-service teaching of Paramedics and MICU nurses to 
bolster support to retain the Paramedic Base Station Radio. Assisted 
in audit of Paramedic receiving hospitals to select regional trauma 
centers for Orange County. 
Family Practice Committee. 
Core Committee Family Practice. 
Emergency Services Committee. 
Regional Paramedic Committee. 
CHAIRMAN Safety and Sanitation Committee. 
CHAIRMAN Disaster Planning Committee. 
EXECUTIVE MEDICAL STAFF COMMITTEE. 
1978 RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA. Consultation for International Medical 
Services, a private firm treating Western expatriate workers. 
November-December 1978. 
1980 -1983 TAIF, SAUDI ARABIA. Director of Emergency Department and 
Chief of Ambulatory Services Al Hada Hospital for the Ministry of 
Defense and Aviation. I was the Senior Medical Officer for this two 
billion dollar project to create a U.S. style tertiary referral and teaching 
medical complex in Taif, Saudi Arabia. 
Add on: Responsible for all medical disaster preparations for the 
third Pan Islamic Conference that hosted forty nation delegations in 
Taif. Spring 1981. Additional two billion dollar budget. 
1983 QUEBEC. CANADA. Organized CANADA HEALTH SYSTEMS for 
Quebec, in association with John Bowen, President of NME 
International. This unique consortium of ten private firms joined with 
the Quebec government to export their health care industry. 
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1983 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA Again with John Bowent we prepared 
a business plan for a Network of Central City Instant Care Centers and 
plans for international expansion Presented to Mr Richard Earner, 
President and Chairman of National Medical Enterprises. 
1984-1985 CERRITOS, CALIFORNIA. Physician staff in start up of Cerntos 
Instant Care a National Medical Enterpnses Instant Care Center. 
1985 -1988 ORANGE, CALIFORNIA. MEDICAL DIRECTOR FOR THE ADMAR 
GROUP, INC. Admar's health programs include a nation wide PPO, 
TPA service and a nation wide propnetary Medical Utilization Review 
program After three years as medical director this qualified me to 
write the board examination in the new speciality of QUALITY 
ASSURANCE AND UTILIZATION REVIEW (see addendum). 
1988 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY Team member 
forming a PPO for employee health plan Worked in five SCE clinics to 
prepare QA evaluation. 
1989 TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURUS. International Medical Corns, under 
contract with US State Department A I D , classified SECRET, requires 
security clearance. 
1989 BUSHNELL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES formed Consultants in 
Medical Informatics for clinical medical practice Includes medical and 
technical writing Two edited medical books published. 
1991 SOUTH COUNTY COMMUNITY CLINIC. San Juan Capistrano, 
California 
On clinical staff and several committees, also as CONSULTANT. 
1) MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE 
2) COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Identifying information fields for capture, storage and 
retrieval on Local Area Network (LAN). 
Installing real time links with wide area networks for 
medical information retneval system, eg direct tie to 
National Library of Medicine. (Requires training staff -
includes 31 physician volunteers - in connection and 
search protocols.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K. : MINUTE ENTRY 
DIKEO, individuallyand as the 
natural parents and heirs of : Case No. 910904651 CV 
the estate of THEODORE "TED" 
JAMES DIKEO, deceased, : JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., : 
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, and HCA 
HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH, : 
d/b/a ST. MARKS HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
The Court having considered the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the memorandum and affidavits in support and in opposition 
thereto together with the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of J. 
Fred Bushnell, M.D. and the Memorandum in Support thereof and 
now being fully advised in the premises makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant 
Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. is hereby granted. The Court is of the 
nnn?R7 
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opinion for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in the Memorandum 
in Support of said Motion and the Joint Reply Memorandum in 
Support thereof that the plaintiffs have, by the record, 
patently admitted that they have no expert to provide testimony 
necessary to show that Dr. Osborn's involvment in the treatment 
of the decedant (there being no actual treatment by Dr. Osborn 
on the night that the damage to the decedant's heart occured) 
did not rise to the standard required under Utah Law. In an 
attempt to satisfy this short coming after the filing of the 
Motion the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, 
M.D.. An examination of that affidavit clearly indicates that 
Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in the same area of practice as 
Dr. Osborn. Further an examination of his opinion clearly 
reveals a lack of foundation and is also clearly based on 
hearsay. Even given a presumption of the ability to rely on 
hearsay to an expert's testimony said affidavit does not meet 
the criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as to 
the standard of the care reqquired for a physician specializing 
in the same specialty as Dr. Osborn. Another deficiency of Dr. 
Bushnell's affidavit is that as to most of the content of 
paragraphs 11 through 23 the statements are based on speculation 
and further do not state the evidence as it appears from the 
record. Therefore, the Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's 
Affidavit is therefore granted. In addition/ it should be noted 
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that the claim of allegations of fact being extant simply is not 
supported by the record. The memorandum of the defendants does 
not set forth the concise statement of the material issues of 
fact that are genuinely in issue as required by Rule 4-501 
(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Further 
there is not a statement of each disputed fact as required in a 
separate numbered sentence nor are any of the facts specifically 
converted by admissible evidence and in fact the record reveals 
admission sufficient to support the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this day of April, 1992: 
Jackson Howard 
Fred D. Howard 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
Philip F. Fishier 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Defendant Dowdall 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David H. Epperson 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant Osborn 
P. O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
David W. Slagle 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendant HCA Health Services 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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DAVID H. EPPERSON #1000 
JARYL L. RENCHER #4903 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Jeffrey S. Osborn 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K. 
DIKEOU, individually and as 
the natural parents and heirs 
of the estate of THEODORE 
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., 
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, and 
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH, 
d/b/a ST. MARKS HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
The Court having considered the motion of Jeffrey S. Osborn, 
M.D., for filing of discovery responses and the fact that those 
matters sought to be included in the record have been submitted by 
plaintiffs themselves and finding good cause appearing therefor 
hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES plaintiffs7 answers to 
Dr. Osborn's interrogatories with attachment and plaintiffs' 
answers to interrogatories of defendant St. Marks Hospital are to 
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*• \ Deputy v;te 
ORDER 
Civil No. C91-4651 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
filed by the clerk of the Court and made a part of the record in 
this case* 
DATED this f day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid, this *ty~ 
, 1992, to: 
day of 
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f s ; 
Jackson Howard, Esq. , ., , j„ h * I z- / ©-A 
Fred D. Howardl Esq. Cfifr~J-cle/<»ere*t ±-f^) 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Defendant, Michael D. Dowdall, M.D.; 
Philip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant, HCA Health Services of 
Utah, Inc., dba St. Mark's Hospital; 
David W. Slagle, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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DAVID H. EPPERSON #1000 
JARYL L. RENCHER #4903 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Jeffrey S. Osborn 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K. 
DIKEOU, individually and as 
the natural parents and heirs 
of the estate of THEODORE 
"TED" JAMES DIKEOU, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., 
JEFFREY S. OSBORN, and 
HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH, 
d/b/a ST. MARKS HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
The Court having considered the motion for summary judgment 
filed by Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and the memorandum, exhibits and 
evidence in support thereof and the memorandum and affidavit 
offered in opposition thereto, together with Dr. Jeffrey S* 
Osborn's motion to strike the affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., 
and the memoranda offered in support and opposition thereto, and 
the Court having reviewed and considered the record in this case 
(neither party having requested oral argument) and after being 
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Judge Richard H. Moffat 
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fully advised in the premises and law and finding good and 
sufficient cause therefor hereby enters its Judgment and Order: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant 
Jeffrey S. Osbornf M.D. is granted. The Court is of the opinion 
for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in the Memorandum in Support 
of said Motion and the Joint Reply Memorandum in Support thereof 
and in support of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D.'s Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D., that the plaintiffs have, by 
the record, patently admitted that they have no expert to provide 
testimony necessary to show that Dr. Osborn's involvement in the 
treatment of the decedent (there being no actual treatment by Dr. 
Osborn on the night that the damage to the decedent's heart 
occurred) did not rise to the standard required under Utah law in 
order for plaintiffs to sustain their burden of proof. 
2. In an attempt to satisfy this shortcoming after the 
filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiffs filed the 
affidavit of J. Fred Bushnell, M.D. An examination of that 
affidavit clearly indicates that Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in 
the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn. Further, an examination 
of his opinion clearly reveals a lack of foundation and is also 
clearly based on hearsay. Even given a presumption of the ability 
to rely on hearsay to an expert's testimony said affidavit does not 
meet the criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as 
to the standard of care required for a physician specializing in 
the same specialty as Dr. Osborn. Dr. Bushnell's affidavit is 
further deficient in that most of the content and statements of 
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paragraphs 11 through 23 are based on speculation and do not state 
the evidence as it appears from the record. Accordingly, 
Dr. Jeffrey S. Osborn's Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's Affidavit 
is granted. 
3. In addition to the foregoing, the Court's rulings are 
also based on the following grounds: 
(a) Plaintiffs' claims in their memoranda of allegations 
of fact being extant simply are not supported by the record. 
(b) Plaintiffs' memoranda do not set forth a concise 
statement of material issues of fact that are genuinely in issue as 
required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
(c) As required by this Court's rulesf plaintiffs have 
not offered a statement of each disputed fact in a separate 
numbered sentence nor are any of the facts of record specifically 
controverted by plaintiffs by admissible evidence; and in fact the 
record reveals evidence and admissions sufficient to support the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. Summary judgment is granted Dr. Osborn with prejudice. 
5. Dr. Osborn's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of J. Fred 
Bushnell, M.D., is ljrkewise granted with prejudice^ 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid, this *j - day of 
lA 1992, to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. (fan J-defined 5V-^S>) 
Fred D. Howard, Esq. 7 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Defendant, Michael D. Dowdall, M.D.: 
Philip R. Fishier, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant, HCA Health Services of 
Utah, Inc., dba St. Marias Hospital: 
David W. Slagle, Esq. 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Michael D. Dowdall, M.D. 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES T. DIKEOU and HELEN K. 
DIKEOU, individually and as the 
natural parents and heirs of the 




MICHAEL D. DOWDALL, M.D., HCA 
HEALTH SERVICES OF UTAH dba ST. 
MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR 
DISMISSAL 
Civil NO. 910904651 CV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
COMES NOW the plaintiffs and defendants in this case and by 
and through counsel stipulate and agree that this case may be dis-
missed with prejudice, with the parties to bear their respective 
costs. This stipulation and order of dismissal shall not prejudice 
plaintiff's claims against Jeffrey s. Osborn, M.D., including any 
rights of appeals, are hereby preserved. 
DATED this T / T a a y of July, 1992. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, 
^ Jackson ^Howard 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ooo3r> 
STRONG & HANNI 
By: 
LiliiTRl RLshler 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Michael D. Dowdall, M.D. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 
David w.Slagle / 
Attorneys for De(^ enjiarit 
HCA Health Services of Utah 
d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital 
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL 
Based on the foregoing Stipulation of counsel and good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to 
the foregoing Stipulation, this matter be and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, with the parties to bear their respective 
costs. This dismissal shall not prejudice plaintiff's claims 
against Jeffrey s. Osborn, M.D. including plaintiff's right to 
appeal any orders of the court heretofore entered against plain-
tiffs and in. favor of Jeffrey S. psbpprn, M.D. 
DATED this Jj_ day of^^tf^«Ar^l992 
oooarn 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this jj^ day of July, 1992, a true 




HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
P. O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
David W. slagle 
Elizabeth King 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 





TZ'6 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-501 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipali-
ties are hereby designated as locations of trial courts 
of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; 
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park 
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; 
West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law. a trial 
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may 
hold court in any location designated by this rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
supporting memoranda and documents with the 
court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all dis-
trict and circuit courts except proceedings before the 
court commissioners and the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to 
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraor-
dinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memo-
randa. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant 
portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Mem-
oranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in para-
graph (2), except as waived by order of the court 
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte applica-
tion is made to file an over-length memorandum, 
the application shall state the length of the prin-
cipal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include 
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed 
five pages. 
(b» Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a mo-
tion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, 
and all supporting documentation. If the re-
sponding party fails to file a memorandum in op-
position to the motion within ten days after ser-
vice of the motion, the moving party may notify 
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (Did) of this 
rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk 
to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Sub-
mit for Decision." The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be sub-
mitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mo-
tion. The points and authorities in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of ma-
terial facts as to which the party contends a gen-
uine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if ap-
plicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. 
All material facts set forth in the movant's state-
ment and properly supported by an accurate ref-
erence to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's state-
ment. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file 
a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively de-
cided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the re-
questing party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
time, 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a 
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered 
to the judge hearing the matter at least two 
working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies 
and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
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(f) If no written request for a hearing is made 
at the time the parties file their principal memo-
randa, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and no-
tice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a 
request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or 
where the motion does not raise significant legal is-
sues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own 
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments 
of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all 
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if re-
quested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery 
documents. 
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures 
within 30 days of trial. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and 
Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 
34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court, 
but shall file only the original certificate of service 
stating that the discovery requests have been served 
on the other parties and the date of service. The re-
sponding party shall file a similar certificate with the 
clerk of the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall 
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service 
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request 
and proof of service upon the opposing party or coun-
sel. The party responding to the discovery request 
shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of 
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses 
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or 
counsel. The discovery requests and response shall 
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the 
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown 
so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance 
with a discovery request or a motion which relies 
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the 
discovery request or response which is at issue in the 
motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of 
the court for good cause shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discov-
ery proceedings in accordance with this rule. All dis-
covery proceedings shall be completed, including all 
responses thereto, and all depositions and other docu-
ments filed with the court no later than thirty (30) 
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right 
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the 
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be presented to the judge as-
signed to the case upon notice to the other parties in 
the action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall 
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for 
such discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of 
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permit-
ting such discovery will prevent the case from going 
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to 
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the 
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date 
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or 
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of 
the trial date. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
and requesting jury instructions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and 
Justice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented 
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in 
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury in-
structions at any time prior to the submission of the 
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the 
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be 
furnished to opposing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing 
and state in full the instruction requested. Each re-
quest shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
original and copies of which shall be free from red 
lines and firm names and shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No. " 
The number of the request shall be written in lead 
pencil. 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a re-
quested instruction, at least one copy of the requested 
instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted 
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon 
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction 
to which the citation applies. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and de-
crees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
written orders, judgments, and decrees to the court. 
This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in 
courts of record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party 
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen 
days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, 
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or de-
cree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless the 
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after service. 
